May 27 2022 Theatres of World War Three: West Africa, the Sahel, and Lake Chad Regions

jayofdollhousepark

May 28

Here I offer insight and policy guidance into what I hope will be the last of the Theatres of World War Three; West Africa, the Sahel, and Lake Chad regions. Mali is the primary conflict now, but a general conflict rages throughout the whole region as Islamic State insurgencies contest with nations under the hammer of famine and drought, and Russia's mercenaries exploit opportunities to seize dominion in defense of elite wealth and power.

Sudan is a pivot point and interface between bounded realms of sub-Saharan Africa as discussed here, and Libya with whose fate it is closely aligned. To disambiguate the Sudan and Libyan Civil Wars from the general regional conflict, Libya being a unique war of colonial European interests as a wishbone pulled between Russia and Turkey for dominion of the Mediterranean, where sub-Saharan Africa, including Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and Nigeria, is not a Great Powers proxy war and civil war but a struggle for power between variants of Islamic State Jihadist groups and the nations which control the resources they covet, with Russia leveraging this into regional dominion through the use of Wagner Group mercenaries as deniable assets.

It is now the presence of the Wagner Group defending elite interests in fighting Islamic State insurgencies and operating the mines for the governments which have become their proxies and front organizations which defines this theatre of war.

And it is the Wagner Group we must interrogate for insight into Russia's plans and methods of world conquest and dominion when as in Syria there are willing surrogates to open the door of empire.

All of this is possible because France has abandoned her former colonies to their fate, because of the brilliant and visionary Islamic State strategy of delegitimation through provocation and implication in war crimes, some real and some false flag operations by elite IS units in French uniforms in coordination with infiltration agents inside actual French entities, and skillful propaganda. In parallel with blackening the reputation of France, ISGS has been successfully building a viable trans-national state in the region.

This means that the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, an independent operational arm of Islamic State West Africa Province created in 2015 with al-Sahrawi's oath of allegiance to IS and split from al-Qaeda, and despite continued factional fighting between the two organizations, is now providing central Command, Intelligence, and Communications to jihadist insurgencies generally in its sphere of influence, as an emergent dominion to which Russia is the only balance. I describe this historical movement as the Syrianization of the conflict.

There are other possibilities for future Africas without foreign empires and their proxy regimes of brutal and kleptocratic tyrants and endless violence for control of resources, and in the long game this requires the free and open sharing of resources among her peoples and states which are guarantors of our universal human rights and secular democracy as a counterforce to fascisms of blood, faith, and soil.

To win the liberty of the peoples of Africa one must begin with food, water, medical aid, and safety; the first requirements of Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs. The political follows the humanitarian. Freedom from hunger, disease, violence, and labor exploitation; liberate a people from these, and tyranny will find no point of leverage.

Beyond this prescription I must give warning here; let us send no armies to enforce virtue, for the most likely result of challenging Russian influence in the region is another Great Powers war of imperial dominion between Russia and France which replicates that of Russia and Turkey in Libya. This will fail, because it plays directly into the hands of ISGS.

If you fight an insurgency with conventional forces, you will lose. ISGS has demonstrated a genius for this kind of war, and in large part it is not the kind of war our armies are designed to fight. In this arena, victory on the battlefield is irrelevant, because the victory you must win is within the human soul. And here we win love and loyalty by standing with, not against, our fellow human beings. We must offer the better alternative in meeting the needs of the people, both material and otherwise.

And in this arena we have clear advantage, for democracy is better than tyranny, equality as diversity and inclusion is better than tribalism, racism, and hierarchies of elite belonging and exclusionary otherness, truth is better than the lies and illusions of propaganda, justice is better than rule by the wealthiest robber baron or the most brutal and amoral bandit king, and a secular state is better than tyrannies of the authorized interpreters and enforcers of divine will, for who so ever stands between each of us and the Infinite serves neither.

A common enemy of humankind is the weaponization of fear by authority in service to power, especially as identity politics and divisions of faith. Gott Mit Uns; it is our most ancient and terrible battle cry, for it permits anything.

As Voltaire teaches us in his 1765 essay Questions sur les miracles; "Those who can make you believe absurdities, can make you commit atrocities."

As written anonymously in al Jazeera; "Russia's game plan for Africa, where it has applied its influence as far north as Libya and as far south as Mozambique, is straightforward in some ways, say analysts. It seeks alliances with governments shunned by the West or facing armed uprisings and internal challenges to their rule.

The African leaders get recognition from the Kremlin and military muscle from Wagner. They pay for it by giving Russia prime access to their oil, gas, gold, diamonds and valuable minerals. Russia also gains positions on a strategically important continent.

But there is another objective of Russia's "hybrid war" in Africa, said Joseph Siegle, director of research at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

Siegle said Russia is also waging an ideological battle, using Wagner as a "coercive tool" to undermine Western ideas of democracy and turn countries towards Moscow. Putin wants to challenge the international democratic order "because Russia can't compete very well in that order", Siegle said.

"If democracy is held up as the ultimate aspirational governance model, then that is constraining for Russia," Siegle said."

As written by Raphael Parens in Foreign Policy Research Institute; "What is the Wagner Group doing in Mali? Since it rose to prominence after its involvement in the Syrian Civil War alongside the Assad regime, Wagner Group, a Russian-owned Private Military Contractor (PMC), has expanded its footprint into Africa. [1] Wagner has immersed itself in Libya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Central African Republic (CAR), and Sudan, leading training exercises, fighting anti-government forces, and brutally quelling protests. Wagner Group often overlaps with Russian state foreign policy aims, but its position as an independent contractor lends it unpredictability, while giving Russia plausible deniability. The group offers the Russian state a valuable tool: the ability to test new environments for military cooperation without appearing heavy-handed or overtly involved.

Wagner has established a pattern of political, military, and economic involvement in Sudan and CAR since 2015. Wagner Group and its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, have followed this strategy successfully in Mali, contributing to France's recent decision to withdraw its military forces from the country. Although Wagner group still needs to adapt its strategy to succeed in a new environment in Mali, the Kremlin has strong-armed a key competitor out of the country. This creates potential contagion effects for the rest of the Sahel, particularly those countries facing long-term insurgencies, such as Burkina Faso.

Wagner Group's Africa Playbook

Wagner Group has pursued the same playbook Mali that it previously executed in Sudan and CAR, demonstrating a strategic outlook and approach designed specifically for African states. [2] This strategy is based on Wagner's response to African governments' requests for security assistance, particularly when African leaders feel that Western states have not done enough to help them via security cooperation, military sales, or through anti-terrorism operations.

Wagner's strategy involves a three-tiered approach. First, it conducts disinformation and pro-government information warfare strategies, including fake polls and counter-demonstration techniques. Second, Wagner secures payment for its services through concessions in extractive industries, particularly precious metal mining operations. Wagner uses a variety of organizations and companies to oversee these extraction projects. Third, Wagner becomes involved with the country's military, launching a relationship directly with Russia's military, usually through training, advising, personal security, and anti-insurgency operations. Throughout the process, the Russian foreign policy establishment's involvement is clear, particularly as the beneficiary of military-to-military relationships with a new potential client state.

Wagner Group deployed fake news and disinformation actions in 2019 Sudan, followed by similar operations in CAR. In Sudan, Wagner attempted to keep President Omar al-Bashir in power, was aimed at protestors against his regime. Protesters were smeared as anti-Islamic, pro-Israel, and pro-LGBT in the news and videos, borrowing tactics from similar operations in Russia. Demonstrating Russian involvement, one leaked memo even included the accidental switch of the word "Sudan" with "Russia."[3]

Wagner's involvement in Africa includes a state military-to-military component, establishing or rebuilding Russian military sales, training programs, and/or agreements with involved states, including CAR, Mali, and Sudan. In Sudan, Russia's relationship with the Sudanese military has flourished, as 80% of Sudan's weapons have come from Russia since 2003.[4] Yet, the relationship advanced once Wagner Group became involved. Wagner contractors were officially deployed to guard Sudanese gold mines, but their involvement acted as a kick-starter for Russia's project to establish naval facilities at Port Sudan. [5] According to expert Samuel Ramani, this operation was intended to help Russia "transit from a transactional relationship with Sudan based on arms sales to a more comprehensive security partnership."[6] Given the recent coup in Sudan, the port facilities agreement remains tentative, as Sudanese security officials reexamine the deal established with Russia.[7]

In CAR, between 170 and 670 "civilian advisors" believed to be Wagner contractors arrived between March and July 2018, some along the border with Sudan. These and other Wagner contractors have trained both CAR government forces and pro-government militias.[8] Wagner provides escort protection to senior officials, including President Touadéra.[9] In related shipping operations, open-source investigators have found Ural 4230 transportation vehicles both in Sudan and CAR, corresponding to sales made to Lobaye Invest and Meroe Gold, two organizations tightly linked with Wagner Group. [10] The CAR example becomes more confusing, though, due to Russia's involvement on both sides of the country's internal conflict, as Russia arms both the government and the insurgent Selaka alliance. The latter threatens oil deposits owned by Chinese firms, creating tensions between Russia and China and potentially each state's PMCs.[11] On the whole, though, Wagner's involvement in CAR is aimed at supporting Russian political-military interests, including a willingness to butt heads with China.

Wagner Group and Russian PMC activity in Africa generally involve payment through mining concessions, operated by companies such as Lobaye Invest, M Invest/Meroe Gold, and their affiliates. In CAR, Lobaye Invest manages "activities ranging from mining to beauty pageants and the screening of Russian movies." Three journalists were killed before an attempt to film Wagner contractors at Lobaye Invest-operated gold mines in July 2020.[12] Lobaye gained the gold and diamond mining concessions due to the PMC contract with Touadéra's government, using PMC contractors as mine guards. Further, Touadéra employs Valery Zakharov as national security advisor, a Russian national with Russian military intelligence ties and Prigozhin financial links.[13] In Sudan, M Invest and Meroe Gold conduct mining operations, which were agreed upon at talks which Putin, Foreign Minister Medvedev, Defense Minister Shoygu, and former President al-Bashir attended.[14] Another Prigozhin company operated as the event's catering service.[15] PMCs guarding Meroe Gold's mining operations also attacked local protestors.[16]

Wagner Appears in Mali

Mali, a former French colony in the western Sahel, is Wagner's most recent expansion target. Mali sits on the fault line between North and West Africa, with religious and political divisions fueling a decade-long conflict. Mali's central government has fought a long-term insurgency by a variety of fundamentalist Islamist insurgent groups, including an Al Qaida branch (AQIM) and Ansar Dine. In 2012, France intervened to support the government against these insurgencies, in Operation Serval and subsequently Operation Barkhane. France also cooperated with other UN member states in conducting United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), under UN Resolution 2391.[17] However, these operations have not succeeded in quelling Mali's insurgencies. In 2021, Wagner Group became involved in Mali as France began withdrawing its forces from the Sahel. If Russia successfully replaces France as the principle security partner in Mali, this could be the first shift in a West African cascade toward Russia.

In Mali, Wagner has deployed its African playbook once again. Prigozhin associate Maxim Shugaley conducted another disinformation operation, releasing a public opinion poll "purporting to show 87 percent support among Malians for the government's outreach to Wagner" by the Foundation for National Values Protection (FZNC). This organization is sanctioned by the US Treasury Department for disinformation activities. The operation, along with an interview by another Prigozhin associate, Alexandre Ivanov, to Malian media, demonstrate Wagner Group's involvement in a bid to enhance its own reputation in Mali.[18]

The military-to-miliary relationship between Mali and Russia is nascent but reflects the recent introduction of Wagner to the country. Around September 2020, Mali's transitional government agreed to accept 1000 Wagner group contractors "to conduct training, close protection, and counterterrorism operations." In 2019, Mali's then-government agreed to receive four Russian attack helicopters, MI-171s with weapons and ammunition, which were allegedly delivered as a "donation" on January 9, 2021, as part of a Mali-Russia military cooperation convention.[19] Given the chronological proximity of these two actions, Wagner appears intimately involved in the growing military-to-military relationship between Mali and Russia.

Overcoming Difficulties in Mali

Although Wagner Group has pursued a similar strategy to that exercised in Sudan and CAR, Mali has presented a unique challenge to the group. Mining investment exchanges are more difficult to obtain and less profitable in Mali, the Western response to Russian actions in Mali appears stronger, and until 2022, France appeared to maintain deeper ties to Mali than it had with Sudan or CAR.

Mining and other investment infrastructure, one of the key financing tools for Russian PMCs in Africa, are limited in Mali and are governed by strict control at the government and tribal levels. Western diplomats in Mali have noted that "the mines Wagner emissaries inspected proved insufficient to pay for the group's services, a reminder of the economic motive behind some Russian power projection as well as its limits."[20] Mali's mineral resources are harder to exploit than those in Sudan or CAR. Government regulations are much stricter than in CAR and are not easily outmaneuvered by private companies. Artisanal mines, particularly those in northern Mali, are controlled by armed groups, such as the Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad, who have disapproved of Wagner Group's arrival.[21] In CAR and Sudan, Wagner relied on mining agreements to secure payment for its military operations. In Mali, the company lacked a clear funding stream and faced Western sanctions, too.

The U.S. State Department condemned Mali's $10 million monthly fee deal with Wagner Group, followed by France, Germany, and the EU.[22] The EU then enforced sanctions, asset freezes and travel bans, against Wagner Group on December 13, 2021, due to human rights violations in Libya, Syria, Ukraine (Donbas), and CAR. The EU accused Wagner Group of "malign influence, elsewhere, notably in the Sahel region."[23] The EU also adopted a sanctions regime related to Mali on the same day, leaving out any individual names.[24]

Until February 2020, most analysts believed that France maintained stronger ties with Mali, similar to its relationship with other West and North African states, than it did with CAR, where Wagner had made inroads. France's long-term involvement in Mali with Operations Serval, Operation Barkhane, and the Takuba taskforce along with the Malian UN mission, far outweighed its involvement in CAR's own UN mission, for example. In Mali, France deployed between 3,000 and 5,100 troops, while only 100 to 260 French troops support various missions in CAR. [25] As of January 2022, France had suffered dozens of casualties in Mali, far higher than any other French conflict on the continent.[26] Yet France has now begun a withdrawal of its forces that will change the power dynamic in Mali—and perhaps the rest of the Sahel.

Wagner's path forward in Mali is not clear cut, however, given that the group must now face a potential shift of resources to Ukraine. Wagner Group forces allegedly already moved from CAR to Western Russia before the invasion of Ukraine began.[27] Other sources have suggested that Wagner troops from Libya have returned to Russia to participate in the invasion, too. They were allegedly assigned high profile assassination assignments in Ukraine, including Ukrainian President Zelensky.[28] Given the heavy casualties endured by Russian forces, the Kremlin may reassign more Wagner forces to Ukraine. Moreover, the sanctions imposed on Russia significantly impact Russia's ability to access funds and equipment, which may impact Wagner's infrastructure, finance, and resupply capabilities in Africa.

How Wagner Will Adapt for Success in Mali

Wagner Group and other Russian PMCs have developed an effective model in CAR and Sudan, coupling fake news and disinformation campaigns, military aid, and payment through mining and extractive industries. This approach has increased Russia's footprint in both countries and can be utilized as the Kremlin sees fit for Russia's African strategies.

Wagner can continue to build the military-to-military relationship between Mali and Russia through its most recent deployment in the country. As of January 20, 2022, U.S. AFRICOM Commander General Stephen Townsend stated that Wagner Group has deployed several hundred troops to Mali from Russian aircraft and with Russian support.[29] In 2022, these forces have reportedly engaged with jihadi forces, suffered casualties, and deployed to several cities in central Mali, likely under a continued anti-jihadi mission.[30] If Wagner wishes to build a lasting presence in Mali, it will conduct training and high-profile security missions as it has in CAR and Sudan. To ensure its economic concessions, the group may need a neutrality agreement with Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad and various Tuareg groups. Further, given the continued Western military and international aid presence, Wagner needs to deploy a large amount of troops and make a significant financial investment in Mali to contest its competitors. This raises the potential for escalation or conflict with French, UN, or related organizations, but this is the cost in Mali.

Wagner can damage Western security interests and public profile in Mali using tactics it developed in CAR. By associating and working alongside with UN missions in military or support operations, Wagner could damage the credibility of these missions, as occurred in CAR. On the other hand, UN Mali and Takuba taskforce leadership may have learned lessons from CAR, and they may enforce stricter anti-Wagner procedures among UN and taskforce personnel.

Wagner's biggest challenge in Mali, though, may be funding. Sanctions remain a roadblock for the organization, limiting potential routes for investment. To secure mining concessions, Wagner must come to an agreement with state and non-state interests that control mines in Mali. The former will likely involve extensive litigation and significant payoffs in the judicial system. The latter could include an alliance or neutrality pact in exchange for concessions, as discussed. Failing this, Wagner Group may turn to the Russian state for direct funding. The Kremlin will then need to determine how much it values a military relationship with Mali—and what price it places on the opportunity to challenge French interests in the region.

Burkina Faso and Beyond

The Wagner Group successfully strong-armed a large-scale French military mission out of Mali. This victory will have long-term effects on the rest of the Sahel, particularly in states suffering from coups or insurgencies. France now appears uninterested in combatting Islamist and other insurgencies in Africa, while Russia and the Wagner Group are willing to get involved.

This development has already had ramifications in Burkina Faso, where coup leader Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba twice attempted to persuade President Roch Kabore to employ Wagner Group forces to fight against the country's insurgency. Shortly thereafter, Damiba led the coup to overthrow Kabore, after his last meeting failed to convince Kabore to employ Wagner.[31] With Damiba in power, it seems plausible that Wagner and the Kremlin may intervene in Burkina Faso as well.

Wagner may have already begun a media and disinformation campaign in Burkina Faso. A protest held the day after the coup featured widespread pro-Russian comments and Russia flags. Declan Walsh points out that the origin of the Russian flags is unknown, particularly at such short notice after the coup.[32] Wagner's next steps could include resource exploitation and PMC deployment to support the military relationship with Russia, though no evidence of this has yet occurred. Wagner Group's appeal in the Sahel can be summed up by a water seller supporting the coup government protests in Burkina Faso: "We support the Russians. Our families are dying, and unemployment is rising, yet France hasn't helped much. At least we can try something new."[33]

As written by Syed Zulfiqar Ali in the Center for Contemporary and Strategic Research; In late December 2021, the Government of Mali denied that it was contracting a private security company (Wagner Group) to help with the security situation in the country. The statement called the reports of such a deployment "baseless allegations." But even before December 2021, there has been evidence of Wagner Group's presence in Mali. According to CSIS analysis, commercially available satellite imagery from September (when rumours of a deal between Wagner and Mali first emerged) to December indicates that a large area was first walled off, and subsequently, the start of construction was observed in December. This area is just outside the perimeter of Bamako's International Airport, in the country's capital. It is just one of the multiple operations Wagner is running in Africa.

The Wagner Group is supposedly a Private Military Contractor (PMC) with links to the Russian Government. But many western officials and academics believe that it does not exist, given the lack of any business registered under the Wagner name. Instead, the term has been used to describe an assortment of mercenary groups and companies which use the same logistics networks and have overlapping ownership. The linchpin of this global network is Yevgeny Prigozhin, a Russian Oligarch with long-established links to Russian President Vladimir Putin. It is widely believed that not having any military background, Mr Yevgeny is a front or a middleman for the organisation, working on behalf of the Russian State.

The Wagner Group has significant links with the Russian Government. It was deployed in Syria along with the Russian Army and took part in major offensives like the one to take back the ancient city of Palmyra in 2016. The group has also been active in Ukraine, where Ukrainian Intelligence, between 2014-2015, intercepted calls of Dmitry Utkin, a former Lt Col in GRU and believed to be the founder of the Wagner Group with the Russian military leadership in the theatre. Besides, Russian Aerospace Forces or VKS aircraft have been linked to the arrival of Wagner personnel and equipment in Mali and other countries where the group is operating, further strengthening the notion of support from the Kremlin.

In all the African countries they are deployed to, Wagner carries out a number of tasks, chiefly the training of the local militaries and militias loyal to the government. They also undertake the protection of some of the countries' heads of government and ministers as well as local and Russian businessmen operating in those countries. And at times, they are deployed with the local forces, which is most common in Mozambique. Securing mineral deposits and overseeing mining operations is also part of their operation in many African nations.

In Mozambique, the Wagner Group was deployed to the Cabo Delgado Province, facing an insurgency by ISIS affiliate Al-Shabaab. The group was tasked to help the local military in routing the insurgents and providing air support via helicopters. Russia has interests in mineral resources and gas deposits in the country. In August 2019, the President of Mozambique visited Russia, and in meetings with President Putin, he signed agreements pertaining to minerals, energy, defence and security. In September that year, Russian planes started arriving with men, vehicles and helicopters for operations in the troubled province of Cabo Delgado. The Group deployed forces with the local military to undertake counter-insurgency operations but failed to have any large impact. The province has large gas reserves both on land and in the water close to the shores, which the Russians are interested in.

In the case of the Central African Republic (CAR), the Wagner Group is the primary means of implementing Russia's military and economic aid. They also help manage access for Russian businessmen to diamond mines and other minerals (primarily gold) extraction sites. It is alleged that Russian advisors and instructors work closely with the CAR military and police and take part in arresting and detaining the local population. The presence of these forces have failed to stop the eight-year conflict, and Russian business has fully taken advantage of this fact, with there being reports that Wagner Group facilitated Russian business mining in rebel-held territories.

In Libya, the group has carried out multiple operations supporting rebel General Khalifa Haftar, including operating Su-24 and Mig-29 aircraft on behalf of the General's Libyan National Army and operating air defence systems. Even with the announcement of a ceasefire and presidential elections, Russian mercenaries are still operating in the country, with the head of the Libyan High Council of State, Khalid al-Mishri, saying in December 2021 that there are still over 7,000 Russians active in Libya. According to Mr Khalid, the Russians required a foothold in Northern Africa, and they got that with the deployments in Sirte and al-Jufra.

Similarly, Wagner's operations in Sudan started shortly after former president Omar al-Bashir's visit to Sochi in 2017. The two sides, among other agreements, decided to establish a Russian naval base in the Port of Sudan. Personnel from Wagner were initially deployed to mining exploration sites, the rights for which were acquired by other companies linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin. Slowly this mounted to military support for the regime. Then in January 2019, the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that Russian companies were now training the Army of Sudan but expressed that they were only undertaking training and not conducting operations with the Sudanese Army. After the coup in Sudan in 2019, companies quietly kept doing their work, relying on their links with the military for political cover, knowing that the civilian part of the government was aligned with the West. But the change in government has led to a snag in Russia's plan for the naval base in Port Sudan, as the current leadership stated in June 2019 that they would review the deal with the Russians.

With the recent entrance into Mali, it would seem Russia, via the Wagner Group, will get rights to mine the large reserves of gold present in Mali, just like they have in CAR. There is another similarity between the group's operations in Mali and CAR. Like Mali, the group entered CAR right after the French force withdrew from that country. Thus, it is not difficult to conclude that the Kremlin uses the Wagner group as a tool to further their influence in Africa by supporting dictators and oppressive governments, which are in tough spots and at the same time also gaining financial benefits for businesses and businessmen linked to the Russian Government."

As written by Federica Saini Fasanotti of The Brookings Institution

Federica Saini Fasanotti; "Russia is intensifying its competition with the United States in Africa. In its asymmetric race, Russia uses nominally private, but in fact state-linked actors such as the private security company the Wagner Group and the infamous St. Petersburg "troll farm" the Internet Research Agency (IRA). Both are a major threat to democracy and rule of law in Africa and beyond.

In its African strategy, the Kremlin is motivated foremost by a desire to thwart U.S. policy objectives, almost irrespective of their substance. Considering Africa "one of Russia's foreign policy priorities," Russian President Vladimir Putin also seeks to create African dependencies on Moscow's military assets and access African resources, targeting countries that have fragile governments but are often rich in important raw materials, such as oil, gold, diamonds, uranium, and manganese. Russian private security companies such as the Wagner Group purport to redress complex local military and terrorism conflicts with which African governments have struggled. They also offer to these governments the ability to conduct counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations unconstrained by human rights responsibilities, unlike the United States, allowing African governments to be as brutish in their military efforts as they like. In turn, Russia seeks payment in concessions for natural resources, substantial commercial contracts, or access to strategic locations, such as airbases or ports.

MOSCOW'S HYBRID-WARFARE STRATEGY IN AFRICA

Since 2006, Putin has sought to rebuild Russia's presence and role in Africa, significantly weakened after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Between 2015 and 2019, Moscow signed 19 military collaboration agreements with African governments. The collaboration has focused in large part on Russian weapons sales.

More importantly, however, the expansion of Russia's influence in Africa has centered on the use of private security companies to deliver counterinsurgency and counterterrorism training and advising to local governments struggling to counter militancy. The expansion of their presence across the continent is taking place despite the fact that since March 2018, Russia has outlawed mercenaryism under Article 359 of its criminal code. Beyond avoiding official Russian military casualties and thus public outcry against and supervision of deployments abroad, the private security contractors provide plausible deniability for the Kremlin. Moscow disavows any command and control over them to absolve itself of their problematic behavior, such as egregious human rights violations and abuse of civilians. They also provide a proxy tool for military confrontations with the U.S. without directly implicating Russian troops. In 2018, some 300 Wagner Group contractors, for example, clashed with U.S. special operations forces in Deir el-Zour, Syria. Beyond propping up governments aligned with Moscow, the Russian contractors are also a source of intelligence for the Kremlin.

Russia's use of mercenary outfits to advance Moscow's purposes has its roots in the 1990s when Russian private security companies, such as the Moran Security Group and the Slavonic Corps, began providing security services to Russian businessmen in Africa. However, the major turning point for Moscow's systematic use of Kremlin-linked private security actors was 2014, when the West levied sanctions on Russia for its annexation of Crimea and destabilization of the Donbas. The Wagner Group — founded by a former special operations forces officer in the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU) — played a prominent role in the Ukraine operations, providing the Kremlin with a preview of its capacities and utility for maneuvers elsewhere in the world. Like the IRA, the Wagner Group is reportedly funded by Kremlin-linked oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin.

THE WAGNER GROUP IN AFRICA

In recent years, Wagner Group contractors have been deployed across the Middle East and Africa, including to Syria, Yemen, Libya, Sudan, Mozambique, Madagascar, Central African Republic, and Mali, focusing principally on protecting the ruling or emerging governing elites and critical infrastructures.

Militants, Criminals, and Warlords

By Vanda Felbab-Brown, Harold Trinkunas, and Shadi Hamid 2017

In 2017, for example, the Wagner Group deployed some 500 men to put down local uprisings against the government of Sudan's dictator Omar al-Bashir. As payment, Prigozhin received exclusive rights to gold mining in Sudan, channeled through his M-Invest company. Before his overthrow in April 2019, Bashir offered a naval base on the Red Sea to Moscow.

In the Central African Republic (CAR), the Wagner Group has been propping up the weak government of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra, whose writ extends little beyond the capital, against various rebel groups since 2018. Its arrival in CAR coincided with a Prigozhin-linked company being awarded diamond and gold mining licenses. The Russian security company has been widely accused of perpetrating severe human rights violations and harassing peacekeepers, journalists, aid workers, and minorities. Wagner's presence puts the CAR government at odds with the United Nations and the Western governments, which increasingly demand that the CAR ends its dealing with the Russian company or risk losing their assistance. In December, the European Union suspended its military training mission in the country.

Libya's geostrategic location on the Mediterranean Coast and its oil and other natural resources have also attracted Moscow and Kremlin-linked Russian private security companies. With access to only one port in the Mediterranean, in the Syrian facility of Tartus, Russia's military presence in the region cannot compete with NATO's Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) and the U.S. Navy's Naples'-based Sixth Fleet. But inserting itself into the ongoing civil war, the Wagner Group deployed units into Libya in 2019 in support of warlord Khalifa Hifter during his attack on the capital Tripoli. The Wagner Group provided advise, assist, and training capacities and, resorting to indiscriminate means such as mining civilian areas, helped Hifter take control of some of Libya's oil fields. Like other foreign mercenaries and militias groups active in the country, the Wagner Group has disregarded the U.N.-sponsored Berlin Conference's demand that they depart. Russia has disavowed any responsibility for the Wagner Group's actions in Libya and their deleterious effects on U.N. peace mediation efforts.

Since 2017, the al-Shabab insurgency in Mozambique began sweeping through the country's northern province of Cabo Delgado. Unable to halt al-Shabab's expansion, the government hired the Wagner Group for counterinsurgency operation in fall 2019, expanding its prior contract of functioning as the praetorian guard of the Mozambican president. However, given its inability to understand the local insurgency and the indigenous military forces with whom it had to collaborate, the Wagner Group's operations failed spectacularly.

Among the Wagner Group's latest worrisome Africa deployments is Mali, where Islamist militants remain potent and governance poor and unaccountable. A complex set of numerous jihadi terrorist groups and regional Tuareg and other self-autonomy movements operates in the country. Among them are dangerous al-Qaida Sahel affiliates such as Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) as well as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (IS-GS). France has been militarily engaged in Mali since 2013, supported by other European countries and the U.S. as well as African countries under the G5 Sahel Joint Task Force, but has not achieved any resolute defeat of the militants. Now tired of the governance and counterinsurgency quagmire, France is slated to halve its contingent there to 2,500 troops in 2022. A military junta that seized power in August 2020, already weak, is turning to the Russians. With access to uranium, diamond, and gold mines as likely payoffs, a 1,000-contractor-strong Wagner Group deployment was to train the Malian soldiers and protect the country's government officials. Facing both Western pushback and domestic outcry, the Malian government in late December denied any Wagner Group presence. Such a presence would severely undermine the sustainability and effectiveness of Western counterinsurgency and counterterrorism support operations as well as likely contribute to further deterioration of human rights in Mali.

DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS

Russia's low-cost hybrid warfare in Africa and competition with the United States and its allies goes beyond the military domain into disinformation tactics. In Africa, like elsewhere in the world, including the United States during the 2016 presidential election, disinformation propagandists like the IRA seek to ignite social conflict within societies and undermine support for democracy. The IRA sought to manipulate Madagascar's 2018 presidential election, for example. Meanwhile, in Mali, the IRA accused French counterinsurgency operations of being a façade for exploiting local uranium mines.

To counter their problematic actions, Washington imposed sanctions against individuals and entities connected to the Wagner Group and IRA; the EU followed. However, as with sanctions on Russian government officials, these sanctions have not led to relevant changes in behavior.

Despite U.N. and Western criticism of the Wagner Group's conduct in Africa and threats of Western financial consequences for African governments that hire the Russian security company and allow it to perpetrate human rights and civil liberties violations, the Wagner Group — encouraged by the Kremlin and doing its bidding — is highly likely to stay in Africa. Sanctions are unlikely to change that. But the Wagner Group's own failures and the counterproductive effects of its actions may in time reduce its allure to African governments."

The Wagner Group in Africa