This mornings state papers aren't lacking in interest. As always they offer a real insight into the divergence between actual official positions and how governments present matters (and any other examples of material that caught people's eye welcome). From RTÉ what struck me as most telling was the following. What government was it that framed matters in the 1990s in this way?
In April 1995, the British complained that they had reached an agreement with Martin McGuinness which would have allowed direct talks between British Ministers and Sinn Féin, only for his position to change later in the day.
According to the newly released Irish document, "the speculation in the Northern Ireland Office is that McGuinness was not free to come to an agreement on his own authority" and that "the obstacle for McGuinness was not Gerry Adams" - implying that others in the Republican movement were calling the shots, as it were.
The Irish government was concerned that unless progress was made, Adams and McGuinness could lose control of the movement, leading to a return of street politics.
The Taoiseach of the day:
warned British Prime Minister John Major that if this happened, hardliners "will infiltrate demonstrations, police will be stretched beyond their limit, and republicans will again assume the status of victims...The movement could split, and the secessionists would be able to resume violence with some kind of moral vindication behind them."
That would be John Bruton in April 1995, no less. And as interesting is this - after the breakdown of the IRA cessation early the following year.
As these documents indicate, contacts between Sinn Féin and Irish Government officials continued despite the end of the ceasefire.
Meetings were kept secret - so secret that the government of the day was accused of not doing enough to keep in contact with republicans.
At one meeting, Rita O'Hare, a member of a Sinn Féin delegation led by Martin McGuinness, drew attention to criticism from the Fianna Fáil TD Dermot Ahern of the government's apparent lack of contact with Sinn Féin.
The Sinn Féin delegation noted that the criticism arose from the success in maintaining the confidentiality of the meetings.
Then there's this 'The Government intervened with the Garda Commissioner after Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams demanded that the harassment of republicans by Gardai "had to be stopped" during the first IRA ceasefire.'
On the X case there's this from the Attorney General of the day and how the Maastricht Treaty impinged on it and an insight into how matters have changed.
In legal advice to Government in June 1992, Mr Whelehan said if the voters accepted the Maastricht Treaty, including the Protocol and the Declaration, it would amount to a "decision by the Irish People to amend Article 40.3.3. of the Constitution so as to permit women to travel to other countries of the European Community for the purpose of availing themselves of a service lawfully available there, viz. obtaining an abortion."
Significantly, he added that he would regard that decision as binding, and "I would not regard myself as having an obligation to bring to the notice of the courts a proposed journey abroad for the purpose of obtaining an abortion."
In other words, there would be no repeat of the X Case.
But:
The Maastricht Treaty was approved by voters, but despite Whelehan's legal advice, it became politically necessary later in the year to put three further Constitutional amendments to the voters. In November 1992, they rejected a proposal to remove the threat of suicide as a ground for abortion, but accepted amendments guaranteeing the right to travel and the right to information.
And the Guardian notes:
The election of Bill Clinton as US president in 1992 prompted the British government to brace for "turbulence" because of his views on Northern Ireland.
The Northern Ireland Office (NIO) said the incoming president's views on the region were unwelcome and urged the British embassy in Washington to confront him, according to an official document declassified this week.
What could have possibly generated such concern?
British officials were especially concerned that the Democrat president-elect had spoken out about killings by the security forces.
Perfidy, was the word that came to mind reading this yesterday:
A separate document from September 1992 showed British frustration with unionist leaders. In a meeting with Irish ministers the Northern Ireland secretary, Sir Patrick Mayhew, called the Democratic Unionist party leader, Ian Paisley, an "extraordinarily dated creature". Of the Ulster Unionist party, Mayhew said: "They're thick."
With friends like that... etcetera. Still, it does indicate the manner in which a part of this island is viewed by many in London. And even for those who would rhetorically offer a different analysis, tellingly it appears to have been entirely rhetorical.
The document, which detailed conversations with British journalists and opinion-formers, is part of a trove of Irish state papers released this week by the National Archives of Ireland.
The diplomat said he told Johnson a "hard egg" approach would lead to "broken heads" and that the priority must be to seek an alternative to violence. Johnson rejected this, saying the IRA had been on the verge of defeat in 1994, when it called a ceasefire, said the diplomat.
"I asked him to name one serious security source who would back up that statement. Surely the lesson of the last 25 years is that there is no security or military solution. This was not an argument he was prepared to accept.
But..
The diplomat's note to his superiors in Dublin said few Conservatives took a serious interest in Northern Ireland. "The prevailing mindset for most Tories is one of resolute anti-terrorism and a hatred of Gerry Adams rather (than) pro-unionism."
The state papers from 1992 offer an intriguing insight into tension between then President Robinson and the FF led government of the day.
[she] was determined to expand the role of the President; government officials were determined to stop her.
Even her trip to famine-stricken Somalia – which was widely praised around the world, and even led to suggestions she should receive the Nobel Peace Prize – caused tension with the government.
There's this too:
documents reveal that an unpublished Irish Government report into the fatal shooting of Aidan McAnespie almost thirty-five years ago found it was 'difficult to accept' the defence of the British solider responsible for the killing.
The documents also show that Northern Secretary Tom King admitted that the British Government could have handled the fall-out from the McAnespie killing better.
In April 1995, the British complained that they had reached an agreement with Martin McGuinness which would have allowed direct talks between British Ministers and Sinn Féin, only for his position to change later in the day.
According to the newly released Irish document, "the speculation in the Northern Ireland Office is that McGuinness was not free to come to an agreement on his own authority" and that "the obstacle for McGuinness was not Gerry Adams" - implying that others in the Republican movement were calling the shots, as it were.
The Irish government was concerned that unless progress was made, Adams and McGuinness could lose control of the movement, leading to a return of street politics.
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