Difficult not to think that whatever the outcome in Ukraine, the events of the last week have altered the shape of things to come almost unimaginably compared to where they were even a short week before. There's a lot to unpack. Firstly neutrality in Europe for many states now appears to be for those who have that status somewhat contingent.

Some of us will be concerned about the questions raised by military aid to the Ukraine from the European Union - granted the Republic of Ireland did not send such aid, but given our neutral status one might have expected, even were non-military aid to be sent, and that's entirely reasonable, that it might have been sent under a different aegis. As Tomboktu noted to me, there is a legal basis for such aid, under article 14 of the Treaty, which was renumbered 28 at Lisbon and this 'provides no role for the parliament' with the decision being made by the Council. I wonder about that last. Such a radical step forward in the positioning of the EU would to my mind require some democratic legitimisation, whatever the outcome. And that's before we get to Irish participation.

But, to be honest, that's only one of many straws in the wind given the latest news that Switzerland will adopt the range of sanctions imposed by the European Union. That's another unprecedented turnaround. And talk of the potential fast-tracking of EU membership for Ukraine etc, though difficult to believe that would be anything more than symbolic and would arrive after a likely Russian military victory.

And there's more.

a survey for the Finnish public broadcaster YLE has found a majority of the country's population is in favour of joining Nato for the first time.

According to the poll, conducted last week over three days before and immediately after the attacks with a representative sample of nearly 1,400 people, 53% of Finns would now support Finland's accession to Nato, with 28% opposed and 19% unsure.

In 2017, the last time YLE's market researchers polled on the same question, only 19% of Finns were in favour of joining the alliance, while a survey for private broadcaster MTV in January showed 30% supported membership.

And in Sweden:

Russia's invasion has also increased support for Nato membership in Sweden, with a survey commissioned last week by Swedish public broadcaster SVT showing 41% in favour and 35% opposed. The Finnish poll suggested that if Sweden applied to join the alliance, support for Finnish membership would rise to 66%.

This despite, or perhaps propelled by, the fact that:

Russia warned last week that if either country sought to join the alliance they would face "serious military-political consequences" from Moscow.

The change in sentiment seems to be a predictable outcome. Who could place much confidence in the bona fides of this Russian government?

And with Turkey limiting the passage of some vessels through the Turkish straits and some interesting noises out of the PRC this builds into a picture of considerable international isolation of the Russian government long before we get to any military measures.

 

Triumphalism about all this is very misplaced. Some of the measures taken so far are entirely legitimate given the unprovoked aggression we have seen, some are potentially unwise. But what is clear is that they are a response to that aggression and while that is understandable it is a time for very clear thinking about what is hoped for over the next week, weeks and months.

For some solid good sense on all these matters it's worth listening to Mark Galeotti's latest In Moscow's Shadow podcast where he raises questions that will be uncomfortable both for some in the 'West' and for the Russian government.

He notes an interesting phenomenon which is that most hawks in the Russian media and commentariat are notably silent. He suspects that there was little or no enthusiasm beyond Putin's immediate bubble.

He has some pointed words on any range of issues. He notes that the change in Moscow's nuclear preparedness status is unfortunate and not without consequence but still relatively low-level. He argues that idea amongst some outside Russia that until hundreds of thousands of protestors are on the streets then all Russians are implicated is a nonsense given the nature of the state and its curtailing of dissent and dissenting voices. And he cautions against banning flights from Russia arguing that this essentially constrains ordinary Russians within that state. 

No-fly zones are a non-starter, and he says the idea is an idiocy and would escalate the conflict immediately perhaps leading to conventional strikes against a range of targets in the west.  And the very fact of the attack against Ukraine, somewhere most Russians regards as cousins even more than neighbours, is something that will build huge resentment amongst Russians in general and even now is causing a degree of trepidation.  Indeed he suggests there's little enthusiasm amongst the military - and he notes that the response of troops on the ground is telling, with them clearly surprised by the hostile response they are receiving. But he also notes that the military is moving slowly because it is holding back. This isn't Chechnya and Kiev isn't Grozny. Not yet, but his fear is it could become so.

Galeotti's view is that Putin won't win - though the future of Ukraine is currently unknowable - but that the danger is with respect to Russia he feels it's a 'modern day reboot of the Brezhnev era' of a slumping economy, very limited interactions with the rest of Europe and the world and so on.

That's a tragedy for Russia and Russian people to add to the ongoing tragedy for Ukraine and Ukrainian people. The border talks continue, perhaps they offer a ray of hope. But the thought strikes, if the current Russian political leadership were agents for some foreign power they could hardly have done a better job of in a single week discrediting themselves (as distinct from the Russian peoples), generating a raft of negative outcomes that provide geo-strategic and economic impediments that will last possibly generations and isolating themselves and the people of Russia in a way unseen since 1991. Or arguably somewhat before that date. Did no-one in the Moscow leadership not realise what the result of the invasion would be? Did they genuinely believe that other states, and their peoples, would not take note and act to the extent that they could? That this would result in a cohesiveness and coherence across a remarkably varied range of states with very different orientations regarding neutrality and other matters. It is genuinely baffling that they did not.