Fred Kaplan, who remains a sane voice in matters military around Ukraine and other areas, argues that while rash and baffling, the latest announcement by Putin that Belarus would store nuclear weapons was: 'To the extent that talking about nukes near Ukraine's borders is provocative, then, yes, it is also provocative, but entirely as show—not worthy of a fuss.'
He notes the US department of Defense was more measured in its assessment of the announcement with the line above in the headline "We have not seen any reason to adjust our own strategic nuclear posture." .
And he further notes:
Here's the thing: Russia has about 2,000 "tactical nuclear weapons," meaning weapons of fairly short range and fairly low explosive yield, designed to be used against military targets on a battlefield. Some are missiles, some are bombs that can be dropped from airplanes; most are either in western Russia or could be moved there.
Putting another dozen or so on Belarusian soil gives Putin no advantage, nor does it alter the strategic situation in any way. It doesn't put Russian nukes any closer to Ukraine than many already are. Nor would a nuclear weapon launched from Belarus exempt the Russian homeland from nuclear retaliation by the West. The weapon would be owned and launched by Russia. (Putin has made it clear he is not transferring control of these nukes to authorities in Minsk; Moscow would remain in control, just as Washington is in control of U.S. nuclear weapons on NATO bases.) As a result, Russia would be the target of a return blow.
Indeed given the rhetoric around Kaliningrad this announcement means less than that. And even that meant little material difference.
That said Kaplan makes a very striking point:
Meanwhile, Putin might have simply caused himself a bit of very avoidable harm. Just four days earlier, at their gaudy Kremlin summit, he and Chinese leader Xi Jinping signed a joint declaration, noting, among other things, "All nuclear-weapon states should refrain from deploying nuclear weapons abroad." This was meant as a slam against the United States, the only country that does base some of its nukes abroad—about 100 of them, which could be loaded onto bombers, in five NATO countries.
It might be a daring move for Putin to tear up one article of his new accord with his "dear friend" to the east, but, more than that, it is a stupid move. The joint statement—and the summit in every dimension—reflected, above all, Moscow's distinctly junior role in this partnership, and Xi, like his fellow dictator, has no patience for insubordination from lesser, dependent powers.
Xi had already backpedaled from his description of China-Russia relations, just before the invasion of Ukraine, as an alliance of "no limits." The phrase was not repeated at last week's Kremlin summit; nor, despite Putin's desperate hopes, did Xi issue any moral or material support for Russia's stalled military.
In a way there's a familiar aspect to this. To in no way dismiss the very material impacts on Ukraine, beyond that so much of what Moscow offers in the contemporary period is rhetoric. A lot of bombast. On one level that makes sense. This allows some greater leverage than doing nothing at all. And yet the problem arises when one compares the rhetoric to reality. That is where weaknesses and flaws are apparent - as in the realty of Sino-Russian relations.
Kaplan makes a call for the US to 'reintroduce diplomacy' into their relationship and he's absolutely correct in that. He notes that the 'balloon' incident was - as a crisis 'turned out to be much less fraught than many tried to portray it. A renewed overture is quite plausible in the near future.'
Ironic if it were possible to have a renewed detente between the PRC and the US on foot of Moscow's actions.
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